A beautifully reprinted special edition book by Clay W. Holmes with a new appendix by Diane Janowski. Historian Holmes first published this book in 1912. He shared reports from witnesses, Confederate prisoners first person accounts, the story of the great tunnel escape, the importance of John W. Jones, and the notorious living conditions in the camp. Diane Janowski is the current Elmira City Historian and keeper of the most accurate list of Confederate dead in Elmira's Woodlawn National Cemetery.
This book is the first about military-media relations to argue for a fundamental restructuring of national journalism and the first to document the failure of American journalism in the national security field for the past thirty years. Press complaints of excessive control by the military during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 were the inevitable result of the failure of American journalism to train competent specialists in military reporting and to provide an organizational structure that would assure continuing, comprehensive coverage of national defense in peace and war. This, in turn, is the result of retaining the city-room concept as the basic organizational feature of the press, with continuing reliance on the generalist in an age that demands increasingly well-trained specialists. So long as the press fails to modernize its basic methods of training to assure well-trained defense specialists, the military will be required to closely control reporters, as in the Persian Gulf War, as a basic requirement of security for armed forces members and the national interests. Permitting the military to control how the military itself is reported is a grave danger to the democratic process. Yet, so long as the press refuses to accept responsibility for large-scale reform, the public will continue to support close military control as an essential element of safety for its sons and daughters in the armed forces, and out of concern for the success of U.S. military operations. This book will be of interest to students of the press, of the military, and of the media at large.
This book examines North Koreaa (TM)s nuclear diplomacy over a long time period from the early 1960s, setting its dangerous brinkmanship in the wider context of North Koreaa (TM)s military and diplomatic campaigns to achieve its political goals. It argues that the last four decades of military adventurism demonstrates Pyongyanga (TM)s consistent, calculated use of military tools to advance strategic objectives vis A vis its adversaries. It shows how recent behavior of the North Korean government is entirely consistent with its behavior over this longer period: the North Korean governmenta (TM)s conduct (rather than being haphazard or reactive) is rational a " in the Clausewitzian sense of being ready to use force as an extension of diplomacy by other means. The book goes on to demonstrate that North Koreaa (TM)s "calculated adventurism" has come full circle: what we are seeing now is a modified repetition of earlier events a " such as the Pueblo incident of 1968 and the nuclear and missile diplomacy of the 1990s. Using extensive interviews in the United States and South Korea, including those with defected North Korean government officials, alongside newly declassified first-hand material from U.S., South Korean, and former Communist-bloc archives, the book argues that whilst North Koreaa (TM)s military-diplomatic campaigns have intensified, its policy objectives have become more conservative and are aimed at regime survival, normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic aid.
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